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I. INTRODUCTION
I and others have argued recently that a United States Supreme
Court decision from the 1991-92 Term, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,1 is a major departure from traditional understandings of the law
of federal courts.2 Although an act of Congress appeared to grant
standing to the plaintiffs in Defenders, the Court ruled that the statutory provision, as applied, would violate Article Ill of the Constitution. Accordingly, the extraordinarily vague and judicially constructed
contours of the case or controversy requirement were employed to
thwart the apparent authority of the United States Congress. This effort
was accomplished, quite surprisingly, under an umbrella of alleged
judicial restraint.3

* Dean and Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. A version of this
essay was delivered in March, 1993 as the Edward G. Donley Lecture at the West Virgnia
University College of Law. I would like to thank my former colleagues in Morgantown for
their helpful comments on the manuscript.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
2. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42
DUKE L.J. 1141 (1993) [hereinafter Nichol, Public Law Litigation]; see also Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 'Injuries,' and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992).
3. See generally Nichol, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1148-69.
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I would like, in this essay, however, to make quite a different
point. As a single case, Defenders may well be a significant departure
from the patterns of federal courts jurisprudence. But, in a different
sense, Defenders fits most comfortably within our traditions. There is
little that is more predictable in the law of federal courts than that the
Supreme Court will be unpredictable. Those familiar with federal
courts jurisprudence would likely agree that it is, in fact, hardly uncommon for the justices to go their own way in this murky
field-which lies somewhere between the civil procedure of real lawyers and old fashioned law professors, and the constitutional law of
semi-professional political scientists and completely unprofessional
post-modernists. But there are, in my view, some frequently ignored
reasons for federal courts laws' malleability and indecipherability. We
have failed to answer the most fundamental questions of the law of
federal courts. We have ignored them, we have created fictions to
avoid them, and most frequently, we have failed to realize that the
questions are even before us-reappearing like persistent but unsatisfied old companions. This is the lot faced by federal courts practitioners and scholars; suggesting the need for heavy doses of both patience and cynicism, and perhaps an ability to carry on, like Sisyphus,
in the face of hopelessness and fatigue.
But I'm getting ahead of myself. I'd like to try to paint the picture I'm interested in by going a bit back in time, about thirty years. I
then will compare, in the most general terms, two bodies of federal
public law, namely federal courts law and constitutional law. The
points that I am interested in will, then, become more apparent. So I
begin with some familiar history.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS

From 1954 until the early 1970's the United States Supreme Court
revolutionalized both American constitutional law and the law of federal courts. On the constitutional side, schools were ordered desegregated,4 the Bill of Rights was made enforceable against the states, 5 First
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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Amendment guarantees were bolstered,6 a right to privacy was "discovered," 7 criminal procedure protections were strengthened,' and orchestrated school prayer was made illegal. 9 Landmark Warren Court
1
10
decisions like Brown v. Board of Education, Reynolds v. Sims,"
Miranda v. Arizona,12 Engel v. Vital,13 and Gideon v. Wainwright 4
recast our constitutional landscape in a remarkable way. The majestic
generalities of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment were
employed to foster a vision of equal dignity and human worth.
During this period, not only was a cascade of new substantive
rights produced, the Justices also installed a variety of procedural
mechanisms to ensure that the guarantee of those rights would be
actually realized. The jurisdiction of the federal courts was expanded
across a variety of fronts. Standing law was marked by Flast v. Cohen 15 and Baker v. Carr16 -opening the door to public constitutional
actions in ways that statutory jurisdiction had been expanded previously. New criminal procedure safeguards were accompanied by major
liberalizations of the writ of habeas corpus-the decision in Fay v.
Noia17 being the stoutest example. Not only would the writ be applied to all constitutional violations, but state procedural defaults would
not defeat federal supervision, and the factual undergirdings of constitutional claims could be reexamined in federal tribunals. 8 The Court
expanded First Amendment procedural forms by providing a federal forum, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,19 even when the remedy sought was direct-

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See
See
See
See
347
377
384

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
U.S. 483 (1954).
U.S. 533 (1964).
U.S. 436 (1966).

13. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

372
392
369
372
See

U.S. 335 (1963).
U.S. 83 (1968).
U.S. 186 (1962).
U.S. 391 (1963).
generally Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:

Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).

19. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ed against a pending state judicial proceeding. 20 The all but
moribund civil rights cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was also
2 in order to help assure the existence
dusted off in Monroe v. Pape:
of an independent federal judicial mechanism of constitutional accountability.22 As a result of this pointed barrage, the exercises of federal
judicial power made commonplace by 1970 would have been literally
unrecognizable to an expert steeped in the substance and the practice
23
of merely a decade and a half before.
This Warren Court "revolution," as may be recalled, was not
greeted with uniform enthusiasm. Many citizens, and the political leaders elected to represent them, came to see the Warren legacy as one of
usurpation. Much of the new constitutional law was regarded as mere
social policy-making, inflicted by unelected judges on an unwilling
populace. And the truism that in a democracy, "policy" is to be made
by the legislatures, not the courts was often stated by the critics of the
Warren Court. Thus, presidents promised to change the direction of the
federal judiciary. Judges would be appointed who would "strictly construe" the constitution, and who would interpret the laws, not make
them up.24
Republican executives would eventually have their say. Presidents
Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush appointed ten new justices to our
highest court; and even though Justices sometimes surprise their benefactors, they do not invariably do so. Twenty five years of the appointment power does make a difference. With the advent of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, pundits predicted a counter-revolution in
American constitutional law. Obviously, the adventurous steps of the
Warren Court would be reversed. The cornerstones of its legacy would

20. Id. at 485.
21.

365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep't. of Social Servs., 436 U.S.

658 (1978).
22. Id. at 180.
23. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts and Section 1983, 73 VA. L.
REV. 959 (1987) [hereinafter Nichol, Federalism].
24. I should add, parenthetically, that President Nixon eventually changed his views on
the need for a strictly construed constitution. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974).
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be dismantled. The federal courts would again become passive and
majoritarian institutions.
The anticipated "counter-revolution" in substantive constitutional
law did not actually take place; or at least it did not take place in any
dramatic fashion. State-ordered segregation is still illegal, public school
prayer remains prohibited. Legislatures must meet the strictures of oneperson, one-vote. Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment guarantees remain basically in place, even if less aggressively applied, and sometimes laced with exceptions.
The Burger Court even found new arenas for judicial activism.
The call for equal protection of the laws was ruled to embrace the
discrimination claims of women,' and the nation's abortion laws
were unceremoniously scrapped in Roe v. Wade.26 Professor Vince
Blasi would even edit an excellent book in 1983 entitled "The Burger
Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't." 27 There is room to argue around the edges, of course, particularly in areas like criminal
procedure, state action, and procedural due process.28 But if we keep
in mind what the presidents and the pundits seem to have envisioned
for the United States Supreme Court, relatively speaking, Blasi was
surely right. The substantive constitutional regime of the Warren Court
may have changed trajectories, but it was not replaced.
Ill. CHANGING THE LANDSCAPE IN FEDERAL COURTS LAW
It is not hard to make the case, however, that a counter-revolution
of real dimension has taken place in the last two decades in the law
of federal courts.29 While in the arenas of substantive constitutional
law the Court has tended to hedge, curb, and solidify, but not to retreat or to destroy, the procedural authorities of the federal courts have

25. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi,
ed., 1983) [hereinafter BURGER COURT].
28. Id. at 90.
29. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARV. L. REV.
315 (1984) (book review).
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been far more directly altered. In area after area of federal courts
jurisprudence, the law of the mid-seventies, eighties, and now, the
nineties, has been directly aimed at dismantling the Warren Court's
procedural revolution.
I will quickly try to illustrate that point by turning to a variety of
federal courts topics. But I ask the reader to suspend normal skepticism on this point, at least momentarily. I do so for two reasons. First,
in my own view, there is no serious doubt that a counter-revolution
has been successfully carried out in the law of federal jurisdiction.
Second, and more practically, I want to concentrate my efforts here on
why this strong change in direction has taken place. As a preview, it
seems to me that the altered course has not only to do with politics
and the obvious changes in judicial personnel, but, with the nature of
federal courts law itself. That is the heart of what I want to explore.
First, has there been a sea of change in federal courts law-unlike
the staggering and meandering that has occurred in substantive constitutional law? Consider a few examples. A logical place to begin is
with the law of standing and Article III. The Warren Court had strongly opened access to the federal courts on two fronts. Generalized,
intangible constitutional claims had been ruled acceptable in at least
some particulars: reapportionment cases like Baker v. Carr" and separation of church and state decisions like Flast v. Cohen31 being
strong illustrations. More importantly, in its waning days, the Court
junked the traditional common law method of determining standing in
favor of an overtly liberalizing injury-in-fact test in Data Processing
Service v. Camp.32
The Burger Court responded in the mid-1970's by completely
cutting off any new turn to public constitutional actions and, perhaps
more significantly, by reworking Data Processing's33 injury standard.
No longer would mere harm-economic, aesthetic, spiritual, or environmental-be sufficient. Injury must be "distinct and palpable," clear-

30.
31.
32.
33.

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Id.
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ly caused by' the challenged acts of the defendant, and likely to be
redressed by a favorable decree. These tightened hurdles were applied
with vigor, written into the Constitution, and made the fundamental
bedrock of Article I1. 34 This move toward constitutionalization embraced the ripeness and mootness doctrines at about the same time.
Thus, the doctrinal formulations employed by the Warren Court to
augment access and to free jurisdictional analysis from the sway of the
claim on the merits, were used by the Court's successors to
constitutionalize new barriers to the developing public litigation model.
Next, in cases like Allen v. Wright3 6 and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,3 7 the Supreme Court changed the focus of the standing determination, away from the plaintiffs stake in the outcome of the dispute,
to a broader, even more amorphous inquiry including the appropriate
separation of powers and a strong concern for federalism. This increasingly restrictive regime was eventually enforced even against the apparent will of Congress.3
An even greater about face has occurred in the law of habeas
corpus. 9 What had been rendered a constitutionally encompassing,
highly interventionist, and intentionally redundant writ has been altered
dramatically. Fay v. Noia4 gave to habeas petitioners the ability to
present constitutional objections which were erroneously not pursued
by trial counsel. The recent decision in Coleman v. Thompson,4 as
well as Wainwright v. Sykes,42 clearly removed Fay's43 legacy. Stone
v. Powell closed the door to Fourth Amendment claims on habeas
34. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68
(1984).
35. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 153 (1987). See also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Moot Cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
the Supreme Court, 22 CONN. L. REV. 703 (1990) [hereinafter Nichol, Moot Cases].
36. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
37. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
38. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1991). See Nichol, Public Law
Litigation, supra note 2.
39. See generally ERNvIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION, 703-10 (1989).
40. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
41. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
42. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

43. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
44. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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in direct contravention of the statute. Teague v. Lane45 has limited
the scope of the writ further; embracing only established constitutional
violations and forbidding the enforcement of new rules on collateral
attack. At least some members of the Court have also set their sights
on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.46 Despite the welcoming
language of the statute and habeas rules, in McClesky v. Zant,47 the
justices went well down the road to allowing federal habeas petitioners
only one bite at the apple. Taken as a package, then, the United States
Supreme Court has done virtually everything possible to restrict the
Great Writ-which I suppose should now be officially called the Puny
Writ. The Court has, in fact, done all it could, short of repealing the
habeas statute, to eliminate federal habeas corpus. On occasion, it has
48
even taken shots at the statute itself.
Track records perhaps less dramatic, but almost equally uni-directional, can be discovered across a broad panoply of federal courts
areas. The door opened to possible federal intervention in unconstitutional state court process in cases like Dombrowski v. Pfister49 and
Mitchum v. Foster5 -- a door which emphasized the "role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state
power" 51-was closed firmly by the effective extension of the Younger doctrine to all civil cases. 2 Younger's march has been relentless,
without regard for the time sequence of filing,53 the unconstitutionali45. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See generally Richard J. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New
Law, Non-Retroactivity and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991) (ex-

ploring Teague in a broader context of constitutional enforcement).
46. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (O'Connor, J. concurring)
(discussing Miranda-violative statements); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)
(O'Connor, J. concurring) (discussing racial discrimination in selection of grand jury).
47. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
48. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (removing Fourth Amendment claims
from habeas review despite the broad language of the statute and the enforceability of
Fourth Amendment claims on direct review of state court judgments).
49. 380 U.S. 4.79 (1965).
50. 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an expressly authorized
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act).
51. 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972).
52. See Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity, 57 FORD.
L. REV. 997, 1032 (1989) ("After Pennzoil there is no principled basis to limit Younger
abstention to criminal, quasi-criminal, and civil enforcement cases.").
1 53. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (demanding abstention
in favor of a
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ty of the statutory scheme involved, 4 or the actual availability of a
meaningful state forum for the presentation of constitutional claims."
The only consistent pattern of the Younger rulings has been the demand for a closed federal door 6
The federal forum was also diminished by a series of supplemental jurisdiction decisions dating from the mid-1970's. While the Warren
Court had expanded the ability of proper federal plaintiffs to attach
related state law claims and causes of actions in United Mineworkers
of America v. Gibbs;5 7 the Burger and Rehnquist Courts answered
with Aldinger v. Howard,58 Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger,9 Merrell Dowell Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,60 and
Finley v. United States,6' each presuming heavily against the availability of the federal tribunal and against the convenience of federal
plaintiffs. Congress has had the final say here with the enactment of
the Supplemental Jurisdiction Act of 1990.62 However, if this statute
gets the same warm treatment that the justices have offered the habeas
corpus act, Congress' final, word may not be final after all.
The Eleventh Amendment has received new life as well. The
constitutional accountability achieved through Ex parte Young 63 was
limited in Edelman v. Jordan.' Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.

subsequently filed state court action).
54. See Trainor v. Hemandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (requiring abstention in case involving clearly unconstitutional state statute).
55. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
56. See Nichol, Federalism, supra note 23.

57.
58.
59.
60.
U.S.C. §
61.

383 U.S. 715 (1966).
427 U.S. 1 (1976) (limiting pendent party jurisdiction).
437 U.S. 365 (1978) (limiting ancillary jurisdiction).
478 U.S. 804 (1986) (arguably limiting federal question jurisdiction under 28
1331).
490 U.S. 545 (1989) (limiting pendent party jurisdiction in exclusive jurisdiction

case).

62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1991); see also Colloquy, Perspectives on Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 41 EMoRY L.J. 1 (1992).

63. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Ex parte Young, obviously, was not a Warren Court decision. But Young's theory was used constantly by the Warren Court, even in ways inconsistent with Edelman. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (overruling recognized by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991)).
64. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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Halderman65 raised a curious constitutional barrier to state causes of
action. The plain statement rule allowing congressional override of
state sovereign immunity has been interpreted with remarkable rigidity,
and replaced waiver concepts that had been accepted for generations. 6
Similar stories could be told about the law of res judicata,67 the
Anti-Injunction Act, 68 and the rules governing implied statutory 69
and constitutional causes of action.70 This is, in short, almost the entire subject matter of the typical federal courts casebook. There is the
occasional exception, of course, like the Court's ruling expanding
federal review power in Michigan v. Long, dealing with the adequate
and independent state grounds doctrine. 71 But even here the opinion
follows the pattern because the Supreme Court's appellate review doctrine springs into place most frequently when a state court has dared
to read federal constitutional guarantees too broadly. The message
seems to be that the Court will reduce federal oversight authority
unless state tribunals are too protective of constitutional rights. In that
event, the Court will ensure access in order to achieve reversal.

65. 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (superceded by 20 U.S.C. § 1403 (West 1993)).
66. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (strict reading of clear statement
rule); see also Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 480 U.S. 468 (1987)
(refusing to apply Parden v. Terminal Railway of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)
concepts of waiver). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Congress, The Supreme Court, and
the Eleventh Amendment: A Comment on the Decision During the 1988-1989 Term, 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 321 (1990).
67. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (holding that collateral estoppel
prevents relitigating search and seizure questions already decided in state courts); Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (expanding preclusion principles).
68. See, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986) (effectively limiting relitigation exception).
69. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (holding that
there is no private cause of action for damages under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1974); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (tight
readings of the implied cause of action doctrine in statutory context).
70. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (holding that a nonstatutory damages remedy is inappropriate in a retaliatory demotion case under the First Amendment);
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (tight readings of the implied cause of action
doctrine in constitutional context). See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Bivens, Chilicky and
Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117 (1989).
71. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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But whether I am right as to the motivations for Michigan v.
Long,72 it is clear that the decision is an exception to the very strong
winds that blow in federal courts jurisprudence. If the United States
Supreme Court rulings in constitutional law over the past twenty years
have nibbled at the Warren Court legacy, but chosen, nonetheless, to
leave the framework intact, the Court's federal courts decisions have
been more bold, more single-minded, less ambivalent, and easier encapsulated in a single vision of federal judicial power. Perhaps it goes
without saying, the rulings have been less constrained by existing
precedent. The body of decisions taken as a whole is revolutionary in
the sense that it embraces major and repeated departures in seemingly
settled jurisprudence. It is "counter," or reactive, in the sense that the
opinions cases seem primarily designed to demolish or debilitate the
rulings of the Warren era.
IV. THE AGENDAS OF FEDERAL COURT LAW
Why that might be so? Why has there been an about face in
federal courts jurisprudence of far more significance, and far less ambivalence, than has taken place in substantive constitutional law? One
answer is probably obvious. Federal courts decisions are less visible,
less apt to stir public controversy than the frequently headline-grabbing
rulings of constitutional law. If the Burger and Rehnquist Courts had
chosen to overtly dismantle the Warren Court's legacy, scrapping one
person, one vote, Brown v. Board of Education,73 Miranda,74 the
school prayer decisions, the incorporation cases and the like, several
things would have likely happened. There may well have been strong
public outcries about the retrenchment. Even if that did not occur, the
undeniably political nature of the Court's rulings, as well as those of
its predecessor, would have been impossible to deny. The Court, no
doubt, would have suffered significantly as an institution. The public
nature of constitutional decisions perhaps explains why the Court came
closest to a counter-revolution in the area of criminal procedure. The

72. Id.
73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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justices have had to worry precious little that there would be a public
outcry over efforts to restrict the rights of criminal defendants. The
television lineup is full of shows about police and district attorneys.
One notices very little fretting over the rights of criminal defendants.
But this same public character is usually missing from federal
courts rulings. Even landmark federal courts determinations like Fay v.
Noia7 5 and Flast v. Cohen76 go unnoticed in the popular press. The
public may believe that the decisions have little to do with our principles of constitutional accountability and the way that we choose to
govern ourselves. They are thought to be technical, the mere
bickerings of lawyers. As a result, it is quite possible to set a completely different course of judicial authority on the federal courts side
without dramatically stirring the pot. And, whether conscious or not,
the United States Supreme Court, in the past two decades, has accomplished such a countermove almost without notice. Younger v. Harris, 7 Pennhurst v. Halderman,78 Warth v. Seldin,79 and Teague v.
Lane 0 have hardly troubled the public mind. Maybe the strongest
proof of that reality is that when Professor Blasi wrote of the failed
counter-revolution in 1983, he devoted no chapter to the Supreme
Court's federal courts rulings.8 Accordingly, the change in directions
was largely invisible and could be accomplished without the apparent
institutional harms likely to result from a direct overthrow of the Warren Court legacy. But, it should be recalled, the Warren Court justices
thought it necessary that substantive constitutional changes be accompanied by procedural reforms designed to make the guarantees meaningful. That conjunction no longer exists in American judicial review.
This is a change of no small dimension.
There may be a second reason that federal courts law has seen a
stronger legacy of manipulation. Federal courts rulings, measuring as
they do, the breadth of federal judicial power, are a curious mix of
75.

372 U.S. 391 (1963).

76. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
77. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
78. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
79. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
80. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
81. See BURGER COURT, supra note 27.
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substantive and procedural law. They are usually less visible and less
publicly controversial than constitutional law decisions, but they are
also more overtly value-laden than many strictly procedural determinations. When a court measures the standing requirement, or asks whether a federal tribunal may interfere with state judicial process, or asks
whether state officers can be sued, or whether a state criminal conviction can be overturned, as is typical in federal courts law, the justices
understandably anticipate-with either enthusiasm or apprehension-opening the doors of the federal courthouse to a fairly predictable set of future lawsuits. State officers will be made to toe the constitutional mark, federal administrative actors will be subject to increased supervision, government decision-makers will be plagued by
chilling damages actions, etc. The avenues and opportunities opened or
closed by extending a statute of limitations or by limiting discovery
disputes or allowing sanctions against counsel are far less predictable.
No matter how impartial the judicial temperament, therefore, the tendency for the perceived desirability of various sorts of claims on the
merits to significantly affect the determination of federal courts disputes is likely inevitable.
V.

THE NATURE OF FEDERAL CouRTS LAW

But these realities of federal courts jurisprudence seem fairly obvious. I am more interested in a difference which comes, in my view,
from the nature of federal courts law itself. To our good fortune, there
has been a good deal of first rate overarching work in federal courts
scholarship in the last five years. Richard Fallon, in a wide-ranging
critique of federal courts jurisprudence entitled "The Ideologies of the
Federal Courts," 2 characterizes the field's scholarship as dominated
by two conflicting ideological models: the Federalist Model under
which "states emerge as sovereign entities against which federal courts
should exercise only limited powers, '' 83 and the "Nationalist Model,"
which "minimizes the significance of state sovereignty in comparison

82. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of the Federal Courts, 74 VA. L. REv.
1141 (1988).
83.

Id. at 1143.
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with national interests and that posits a constitutional and statutory
preference for federal over state courts as the guarantors of federal
rights." There are points to quarrel with on Fallon's thesis. But
surely his broader claim is a good one-that answers to federal courts
dilemmas will be stronger if they are derived from the examination of
particular contexts rather than these broad predispositions.
Professor Michael Wells has argued, on the other hand, that the
helter skelter pattern of federal courts rulings is more accurately attributed to overt judicial manipulation designed to achieve certain goals on
the merits than any shifting battle between national and federalist
perspectives.85 Wells claims "that a crudely political view of judicial
motivation yields a more plausible and more powerful account of most
judges' behavior than Fallon's thesis. 86 He adds that "one cannot
fully and accurately explain the contemporary law of federal courts, or
argue persuasively about what the rules should be and why, without
acknowledging the systematic disparity between federal and state judges and the importance of substantive considerations in the resolution of
jurisdictional issues. 87
Martin Redish, however, thinks that both Fallon and Wells are
wrong. For Redish, the best understanding of federal courts jurisprudence is derived through what he calls the "institutionalist perspective." 88 The normative ideal of federal courts law emphasizes that, in
Redish's words, "issues not controlled by the Constitution are to be
resolved on the basis of judicial policy assessment only to the extent
the representative branches have not already made that policy choice
through legislative action."8 9 An appropriate recognition of both constitutional and statutory power will, in Redish's view, solve most of
the work of a confused federal courts jurisprudence.

84. Id. at 1144.
85. Michael Wells, Rhetoric and Reality in the Law of Federal Courts: Professor
Fallon's Faulty Premise, 6 CONST. COMM. 367, 368 (1989).
86. Id.
87. Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 609, 644 (1991).
88. Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive
Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761, 768 (1989).
89. Id.
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These broad efforts, as well as Barry Friedman's recent dialogic
approach to the analysis of federal judicial power, 9° capture major
strands of the last three decades of federal courts law and scholarship.
I agree with a good deal of each of their respective emphases. But as
I read their overarching examinations of the field of federal courts, I
am left with the feeling that they, in each instance, underemphasize
one of the most persistent dynamics of federal courts decision making.
That dynamic, in my view, helps to explain why federal courts law
has weathered the political storms of the past three decades so poorly,
and why there has been so little there to constrain judges of differing
political philosophies.
My own sense of it is that the most persistent, perplexing, and
unanswered questions of federal courts jurisprudence deal with the
appropriate relationship between a tradition of extant' common law
forms which provide the framework for federal litigation on the one
hand, and the consistent tug of new demands of constitutional accountability on the other. That sounds, no doubt, hopelessly vague and
lacking in content. Or perhaps like an obvious truism. Let me, therefore, provide a few examples of what I mean.
Start at the beginning, at least the beginning in some sense, with
Marbury v. Madison.91 Marbury presented a question of judicial power-one supposes the question of judicial power. Was the Judiciary
Act of 1789, as misinterpreted by Chief Justice Marshall, 92 inconsistent with Article II of the Constitution? The demands of the enforceability of a new written constitution seemed to call out for the power
of judicial review. But, although Marshall surely did not emphasize the
point, the common law traditions of litigation hardly reflected a power
in the justices to regard an act of Congress as void. English practices,
as well as the great bulk of colonial processes, embraced no such
authority. Still, Marshall reasoned his way to a conclusion accepting
(hardly against his will, of course) the power of judicial review in
order to avoid rendering the constitution, in his judgment, a meaning-

90.
91.
92.
Supreme

Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1993).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 465 (1989).
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less scrap of paper. The forms of common law practice, without textual mandate, gave way to a trumping demand for constitutional accountability.
This is hardly new learning. But this same process of rejecting old
wineskins is repeated continuously in federal courts jurisprudence.
Again, the law of standing is a good example. To the great surprise of
all but the most cynical, after over 200 years we still have no real
idea what the term "case or controversy" means. 9 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 94 Justice Scalia simply defined it through "common understandings" that he seemingly made up as he went along. 95
Has it always been thus? Perhaps. In Osborn v. Bank of United
States,96 the great Chief Justice Marshall suggested that in order to be
a case, a suit must "assume such a form that the judicial power is
97 This, of course, is no more helpful than
capable of acting upon" it.
Madison's circular definition of the case or controversy requirement as
limiting the courts to matters "of a judiciary nature."9' Adding to the
confusion, in Osborn99 itself the Court very decidedly changed the
judicial forms available to federal litigants by authorizing enforcement
of the remediless provisions of the constitutional charter by injunctive
decree. So Marshall really seemed to be saying that you have a case if
its like what we have done before, or what we choose to do now.
The law of standing, particularly in the 1950's, 1960's and early
1970's, repeatedly cast off the forms of the common law to assure
greater constitutional and statutory accountability. 1° There were limits to this accountability, of course, as cases like Valley Forge0 1
93. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article Ii, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 1915 (1986).
94. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
95. Id. at 2136. See generally Nichol, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2.
96. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824) (Marshall, J.) (superceded by statute in 721 F.
Supp. 139 (1989)).

97. Id.
98.

2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand, ed.,

1911).
99. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 728 (1824).
100.

See JORDAN VINING, THE LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW

(1978).
101. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church &
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proved. The Court would not hear a constitutional objection alone,
unaccompanied by consequential harm. But there is no answer provided in standing law to the question, "How much of our litigation tradition will be rejected in favor of constitutional accountability?" The
most that can be said is that we have gone this far, and no farther.
And it is difficult to tell even where "this far" is.
Consider as well the Eleventh Amendment. It is another notoriously contrived, nonsensical, and inconsistent aspect of federal courts
jurisprudence. A suit is a case against the state if one sues a state
official in his public capacity seeking damages, but not if an injunction
under federal law is sought. 1°2 The state sovereignty reflected in the
Eleventh Amendment can bar federal suit unless Congress is very clear
that it seeks to make states judicially accountable. 10 3
This means states enjoy a profound protection as against the federal government unless the federal government really wants to take the
right away. One can imagine John Calhoun's reaction to that. A law
suit which completely bars a sovereign state from enforcing some of
its laws is not, after all, a suit against the state so long as the plaintiff
merely remembers to name the governor or attorney general as defendant. This conclusion, I have always thought, should give fledgling
lawyers hope-recognizing that there is no argument too absurd to
make its way into a United States Supreme Court opinion. These notorious Eleventh Amendment dodges have taken place because we have
refused to face squarely the tension between the sovereign immunity
traditions of our common law process and the demands of constitutional accountability. Rather than face these beasts head-on, we have created fictions to guide and undergird all major constitutional decision
making in the federal courts. We have not looked good in the process.
To provide yet another example, the constitutional damage claim
cases are very similar. Until 1971 it was not possible to state a claim
for damages against a federal official based directly on the Constitution."c4 The theory, not unrelated to the concept of sovereign immuState, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
102. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651

(1974).
103. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
104. In 1971 the Court decided Bivens v. Six Unnamed Named Agents of the Fed.
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nity, was that such damages claims against government officials at
common law had to be created by the legislature. But how could that
square with our growing demands of constitutional enforcement? We
had long said that the Constitution could be enforced by injunctive
decree. Why not through the use of damages claims, especially in
circumstances under which, in real terms, relief is either money or
nothing?
Again we chose not to answer directly. As Justice Stevens put it
in Bush v. Lucas, 0 5 in constitutional damages cases "we might...
hold that it is the province of the judiciary to fashion an adequate
remedy for every wrong, ''l °6 sounding, of course, in the constitutional
accountability side of federal courts jurisprudence. Or, he admitted, we
might have said that federal courts are tribunals "of limited jurisdiction
whose remedial powers do not extend beyond the granting of relief
expressly authorized by Congress."' ' Our cases, Stevens wrote,
"have unequivocally rejected both extremes.' ' 108 We have, in other
words, taken our half from the middle and constructed a body of decisions which can make no sense to anyone. As a result, these damages
actions are based directly on the Constitution, suggesting that they are
indeed exercises in constitutional interpretation. Still, though, relief will
be denied if "special factors" exist or if Congress seems to be opposed
to it.109 These are strange conclusions for exercises in constitutional
interpretation.
I offer one final example, though more could be found. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state actors from depriving persons of due
process or equal protection of the laws. Title 42, section 1983 of the
United States Code" 0 grants a cause of action in law or in equity
against any person who subjects one to a deprivation of federal rights.
State judges are persons subject to the strictures of both the Fourteenth
Amendment and section 1983. Can, therefore, a federal court prevent a
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
105. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
106. Id. at 373.
107. Id.

108. Id.
109. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 413 (1988).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
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state court from depriving a federal plaintiff of a constitutional right in
a state tribunal?
In Mitchum v. Foster we seemed to answer that question affirmatively, drawing upon the rigors of constitutional enforcement and the
history and power of section 1983."' In Younger v. Harris and its
now extensive progeny, though, we have concluded that the demands
of "Our Federalism," rooted at least in part in the practices of the
courts of equity, prevent federal interference."' The Supreme Court
has felt no compulsion to explain the inconsistencies, behaving as if
the cases were distant relatives unlikely ever to appear in the same
locale. Similar results can be found in the section 1983 immunity
cases which measure constitutional accountability and common law
protections from suit 3as if they were cut from the same cloth rather
than polar opposites.1
We have, in short, a system of litigation forms and practices
which not infrequently fails to provide meaningful recourse for constitutional noncompliance. Over and over in our jurisprudential history,
we have changed our practices in order to assure constitutional compliance. However, at the same time, we have been too timid-perhaps
reasonably too timid-to make constitutional accountability, rather than
the traditions of practice, the touchstone of federal judicial authority." 4 The resulting jurisprudence of federal courts, therefore, is primarily only a pattern of movement-a battleground, as Arnold put it,
reflecting only the lines "where ignorant armies clash by night.""' 5
Neither theory nor doctrine can long prevail here, and the judges tug
and retreat before extraneous forces only barely concealed.

111. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
112. 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971); see also Trainor v. Hemandez, 431 U.S. 434, 456
(1977); Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
113. Compare Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) with Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S 547
(1967). See generally Nichol, Federalism, supra note 23.
114. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227 (1990) (Professor
Bandes argues in effect that we should have made the leap to constitutional accountability).

115. THE POEMS

Op MATHEw

ARNOLD 256-57 (M. Allott, ed., 1979).
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CONCLUSION

If a shred of this is true, what might it have to do with my original set of questions? Why has there been a counter-revolution in federal courts law that apparently did not take place in substantive constitutional law? If my description of the nature of much federal courts law
is accurate, it stands to reason that the predilections of the Justices
would have strongest play in an area like federal courts law where, in
short, there is no traditional notion of doctrine or law to constrain
them. In fact, it is not difficult to imagine that in moving again back
and forth between the poles of common law process and constitutional
accountability, the Justices do not regard themselves as exercising a
freewheeling discretion or breaking new ground at all.
What is surprising, in my view, is how little honest, straightforward, old-fashioned, explanation-giving is ever attempted. The standing
doctrine is described as "more than an intuition, but less than a rigorous theory."'1 16 The linchpin of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is openly described as a "fiction"' 17-- without more, as if
the concession alone lets the justices off of the hook. Inconsistent
versions of history and traditional practice are rolled out without apparent embarrassment in Younger". and in section 1983 cases in order to sustain divergent results. 119 Mootness principles cannot be
squared with other Article III standards. 20 The habeas decisions frequently seem to forget that the cause of action is governed by stat2
ute.' 1
The law of federal courts looks then to be the law of power, the
law of the moment, and the law of trends and trepidations. Like life
itself, it is not tidy. It speaks poorly, now that I think of it, of anyone

116. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Judge Bork in Vander Jagt v.
O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (1983) (Bork, J. concurring)).
117. See Justice Powell's opinion in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89, 90 (1984).
118.
119.
120.
121.

401 U.S. 37 (1971).
See Nichol, Federalism, supra note 23.
Nichol, Moot Cases, supra note 35.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
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seriously interested in its study. It is not the business of clear thinkers
and relentless minds. True theoreticians eventually abandon the field
with disdain, scoffing at the pedantry of their former colleagues. Federal courts law is the domain of lawyers, Supreme Court Justices,
politicians, unfancy law professors, and other rogues. May we all feel
at home.
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